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18th February 2020

Fruitful security from CHERI and Morello

Morello et la Sécurité des Interfaces Logiciel/Matériel
Who has rounded-corner windows at home?

Why planes don’t have squared-corner windows?
Memory safety

• Buffer overflows and memory safety issues have had a way too long history!
  • First documented buffer overflow dating from 1972 [Wikipedia]

• 50 years later ... where are we standing?
  • Not much has changed
  • Both Google and Microsoft recognize that 70% of the security issues in their products involve / start with a memory safety issue
  • What was a minor annoyance in the 70s is now a financial drain and a huge security / privacy issue
  • The boiling frog metaphor illustrates pretty well the issue. We need to jump out of the pan!

(Note: no frog has actually been hurt or boiled)
Capabilities to the rescue! (maybe)

- Capabilities are essentially fat pointers, i.e. pointers with extra information
- They allow enforcing memory safety at runtime
- They exist since the very beginning of the computer industry, and have been in use for quite some time actually
  - CAP computer at the Cambridge University Computer Lab (1970)
  - System/38 from IBM (1978)
- ... until they were set aside by segmentation / pagination-based memory management which was way easier and cheaper to implement back then.
Why capabilities?

- The capability concept has stood the test of time
- They are relatively easy to formalize
- CHERI sketches a plausible path to deployment
- A number of parties, including UK’s NCSC and industry players are showing interest
- Alternatives are looking more speculative, or solve less of the problem or require more software and/or hardware resources
Presentation outline

• A CHERI overview
• The (very) big Morello picture
• A sketch of Morello architecture
• A higher level view on Morello
• Open questions on Morello
CHERI overview
About CHERI

- **CHERI**: Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions

- Started ~ 9 years ago as part of project **CTSRD** (pronounced "custard"):
  - **Clean Slate** Trustworthy Secure Research and Development
  - **Goal**: Rethinking the hardware-software interface for security,
  - a DARPA-funded project (part of DARPA CRASH programme) with Google’s support
  - a joint research project of the Cambridge University Computer Laboratory and **SRI International**
Memory capability basics

• Capabilities are used wherever a pointer / reference is used

• Capabilities include:
  • Base, pointer, and size (or limit)
  • Access rights: read / write / execute / …

• Instructions manipulating capabilities can only *reduce* their range and permissions

• Capabilities cannot be forged
  • Capabilities are protected by a fragile tag which is cleared when the location is written by a non-capability instruction
  • Only valid capabilities (i.e. tag is set) can be used by the capability instructions and load/store

• Capabilities do not replace MMU and paged memory
  • They go on top of it
  • Provide fine grained access policy for code and data
A hardware perspective on CHERI architecture

• CHERI restricts access to memory and system resources *within* a virtual address space
  • Originally (1960s, 1970s) capabilities controlled access to physical memory

• CHERI replaces virtual addresses with memory capabilities that comprise
  • A virtual-address pointer component
  • A meta-data component that encodes
    – (Compressed) bounds (base and limit) on the pointer
    – Permissions to use the capability in certain ways (e.g. mutable/immutable)
    – Permissions to use the object identified by the capability in certain ways (e.g. R, W, X)

• CHERI can be embedded in any modern 64-bit host ISA: MIPS, Arm’s A64, RISC-V, x86-64...
  • See CHERI architecture

• CHERI mostly affects the load & store part of its host ISA
  • Some additional instructions operate on capabilities themselves
A software perspective on CHERI architecture

- CHERI gives *spatial safety* to programs written in memory-*unsafe* languages (e.g. C/C++)
  - And good hooks for adding *temporal safety* at a cost similar to garbage collection...
  - And weak *control-flow integrity (CFI)* ...
    - Similar to A64 with PAC + AUT (reverse CFI) + BTI (forward) or x86 with shadow stack and landing pads

- CHERI supports fine-grain, recursive delegation of access privileges
  - Accesses checked by hardware at hardware speed

- CHERI supports secure compartments *within* a virtual address space
  - A lighter weight alternative to compartmentalizing with OS processes
  - Compartments are a vital tool to resist security exploits
    (c.f. Thomas Dullien’s *Weird machines, exploitability, and provable unexploitability* –
    his assessment implies a need for many, fine-grained compartments...)

- CHERI has *formal ISA semantics*
  - Formalization of *architectural security properties* is a work in progress
The (very) big Morello picture
In brief, *Morello* is...

- A specific variety of cherry
- An *instruction-set architecture* (ISA) derived from Arm’s A64 and Cambridge Computer Laboratory’s *Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions* (CHERI)
  
  [CHERI architecture](#)
- A Mobile/Server-class ASIC containing multiple Morello-enhanced, Arm CPUs
  - Derived from Arm’s *Neoverse™ N1* derived from Cortex® A-76
- A development board containing the Morello ASIC
  - Derived from an existing, non-public, Arm development board
  - The board has the resources to boot Android and act as a low-end server
- A UK government funded project under the *Digital Security by Design* [DSbD](#) umbrella
  - Approximately £70m committed by government
  - More then £100m in kind committed by Morello project industrial partners
The *Morello* project will...

- Fund creating a Mobile/Server-class ASIC and 500-1,000 development boards
  - The number of boards depends on test-chip yield, funding, and component cost (all variable)

- Support evaluation of deployment options and priorities by Arm’s industrial partners
  - Public support at the [DSbD](#) launch from both Microsoft and Google

- Support evaluation of different software and hardware implementation options
  - For example: the Morello board will support two ways to tag memory, one appropriate for Mobile (no ECC on DRAM) and one appropriate for Server (with ECC on DRAM)

- Support a broad academic research program
  - From *Computer Science* to *Social Science*...
  - From theory/proof/formal to empirical studies of large-scale software...
  - Hardware and software...
Morello is not ...

• Morello is not the final architecture implementation:
  • It will be the **ONLY** implementation of this prototype architecture

• Morello has **NO COMMITMENT** to forward / backward compatibility
  • But successful concepts are expected to become part of an ARM architecture extension and/or CHERI
Why are we presenting this?

Our aim is to:
- Break the cyclic dependency between software and hardware...
- Understand the cost of implementation, deployment and use of these new concepts
- Get useful feedback before committing any variant of it to CHERI or the Arm Architecture

Because we need:
- Answers to performance questions for a wide range of different usage models
- Compelling examples of Capabilities offering a security / performance improvements
  - Backed up by “Red-teams” having attacked the system and demonstrated security of the system
  - Compelling in comparison with existing deployed state of the art exploit mitigations
- Understanding of how different languages and run-times can use capabilities
  - Not just C and C++, but also Javascript, Java, Rust, ...
- Far better understanding of how fine-grained compartmentalisation can be used and supported
- A showcase to encourage other architectures to adopt the same concepts
- Experience of the SoC hardware to implement systems based on the CHERI concepts
Morello architecture $\approx$ CHERI + A64
Capabilities in storage and on buses

Capabilities in registers and on buses

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>128</th>
<th>127</th>
<th>64</th>
<th>63</th>
<th>32</th>
<th>31</th>
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<td>Tag</td>
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<td>C Reg</td>
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</table>

Capabilities in memory

- 16-byte aligned
- A 1-bit tag is stored separately (in separate tag memory, or using the ECC code on the 128 bits)

Tag is fragile

- Preserved by specific instructions, cleared or ignored by any other access to the location
- De-referencing a capability with no tag causes a machine exception (capability fault)
A draft Morello capability in detail

Details of field sizes and permissions might change

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<td>109:95</td>
<td>94:64</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Object type
- 0: Capability is *mutable*
- Non-0: Capability is *sealed*

Permission
- Load
- Store
- Execute
- LoadCap
- StoreCap
- StoreLocalCap
- Seal
- Unseal

Permission
- System
- BranchUnseal
- CompartmentID
- MutableLoad
- User[4]
- Global
- Executive
- ...

Not all combinations of bounds and value can be represented.

Simultaneous views of 63:0
A draft Morello capability in detail

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Tag
Permissions
Object type
Bounds [86:56]
Flags
Value [63:0]
Bounds [55:E+16]
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Not all combinations of bounds and value can be represented.
Compressed bounds

- Vanilla CHERI capabilities are 256(+1) bits fat
  - A reasonable choice research-wise from CUCL as it allows easy exploration
  - From an industrial point of view, we believe this is way too large to be deployed

- Morello capabilities are 128(+1) bits fat
  - Achieved using a pointer bound compression technique similar to floating point encoding
Bounds compression – the essence of it

See **CHERI Concentrate: Practical Compressed Capabilities** – Morello will be different in detail

Not all bounds values are representable, constraining how far *Value* can be taken out of bounds before it is impossible to represent the derived capability.
Morello machine states & instructions

- **A64:**
  - Aarch64 ISA + minimum set of instructions to operate on capabilities
  - Memory accesses are address-based by default (*pointer = address*)

- **C64:**
  - Aarch64 ISA + minimum set of instruction to operate on pointers
  - Memory accesses are capability-based by default (*pointer = capability ≠ address*)
  - Address-based memory accesses are interpreted relative to DDC

<table>
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<tr>
<th>AArch64</th>
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<th><strong>C64</strong></th>
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<td>Extension</td>
<td><strong>A64</strong></td>
<td><strong>C64</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><code>add c0, c1, x2</code></td>
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</table>
Morello machine states & instructions --- intended use

- Same instruction encoding, but “address” interpretation depends on the machine state

**A64**
- Legacy, AArch64 support – *pointer = address*
- Minimum a set of instructions to operate on capabilities

**C64**
- Operate in a capability-based world – *pointer ≠ address*
- Minimum set of instructions to operate on pointers as (DDC-relative) addresses

Inter-operate between capability and legacy modes at a protection boundary, e.g. EL0 / EL1.
A glimpse at some instructions

- **Getters:**
  - `gclen x0, c1` ; Get length
  - `gcperm x0, c1` ; Get permissions

- **Setters:**
  - `scperm c1, c0, x2` ; Set permission (reduce only)
  - `scbnds c1, c0, x2` ; Set bounds (reduce only)

- **Memory accesses:**
  - `ldr x1, [c0, #8]` ; load

- **Control flow:**
  - `blr c0` ; Branch & Link
A higher level view
Fine grained protection – Memory management

• With programming languages & abstractions, software carves up an address space into objects and references between those objects
  • Some languages are better than others at providing some guarantees...
  • But this stays a software construct, with little to no hardware enforcement

• Hardware should enforce correct use of references
  • Spatially, between objects
  • Temporally, as the memory layout evolves in time and memory gets repurposed
  • At hardware speed !

• Ideally tooling and language driven...
Fine grained protection – Compartments

- Ideally, in any address space in any EL / security state / ...
  - And as strong as MMU based compartments (VMs, processes)
- Ideally, cheap to create and destroy compartments
  - Encourage the use of lots of small compartments, reduce the attack surface for all types of exploits
- Ideally, supporting different trust models
  - At least symmetric and asymmetric distrust...
Compartments – the essence of it

• The memory image of a compartment is all the memory transitively reachable from the root capabilities it was started with.

• Transfer of control between compartments requires:
  • Atomically (from the perspective of code executing at this exception level) jumping to an entry (resp. resume) point in the other compartment
  • Swapping the memory context so that the memory from the first compartment is inaccessible (other than transferring control back to the origin, or thru capabilities passed explicitly as arguments) when entering the second compartment.
Architectural challenges and opportunities

- Instructions to transfer control between compartments (security domains) give opportunities to purge or limit speculative state and the opportunity to exploit it
  - [CHERI architecture] states: *In order to achieve compartmentalization, and not simply isolation, CHERI’s selective nonmonotonic mechanisms can be used*:
    - exception handling
    - jump-based invocation
- CHERI also defines a *compartment ID* register that hardware can monitor
- Whatever the mechanism, and whatever the distrust relationship between compartments, natural, identified points in the instruction stream are needed to tame speculative execution attacks between security domains
  - Without first-class compartments, the only mitigation hook is a *speculation barrier* instruction, resembling those introduced in v8.5 of Arm’s 64-bit architecture
- It remains micro-architecturally challenging to effectively use this architectural opportunity!
What can / could be done better with capabilities?

- **Hardware enforced** `const` qualifier:
  ```c
  void function(const Object *p)
  ```

- **Give only access to a smaller range of memory:**
  ```c
  struct S { /* some fields */ };
  void f(struct S *p);
  struct S *tab[10] = malloc(10 * sizeof(struct S));
  for(int i=0; i<10; i++)
      f(&tab[i]); // f can not access outside the object it was given!
  ```

- **Compartment unsafe libraries / untrusted code:**
  ```c
  libjpeg_decode(&MyShip, "~/Download/alien.jpeg"); // No one will hear you scream
  ```

- **Compartment safe / trusted code:**
  ```c
  Err = EverCrypt_AEAD_encrypt(...);
  ```

- **Garbage collection**
Compilation and language issues

• C/C++ fundamental assumption that pointer = address = integer
• Pointer provenance
• `*cpy /*move functionality needs extra care to preserve tags`
• Code generation tactics (e.g. for managing stack frames) may make material differences to resisting the first essential step in an exploit chain that breaks memory safety
  • This is how 2/3 of today’s exploits begin (according to Google and Microsoft)
Are all problem solved then?

- No!
- ABI impacts?
- CHERI allows plain old pointers to coexist with fat pointers, in order to ease the migration... But how to handle that?
- Linking applications is becoming even more interesting...
- Loading applications and “seeding” the capabilities...
- This all requires changes in the OS / libc / ld.so / debuggers / traces / ...
- People distributing full environment (Android, ...) need to be involved as they will have to manage a transition. On the other hand, they have a strong incentive to improve security.
- Memory safety is only a part of the security problem --- a significant one though
Experience return 😊

• We have recompiled many large code bases. Most had to be “fixed”...
  • Most of the world’s software has migrated to 64bits pointers, so moving to 128bits pointers will be easy because they have learned the lesson, haven’t they...
  • Lots of code bases built for CHERI exhibited out of bounds access...
  • People are doing smart horrible things with pointers
  • The good point is ... this shows right away that CHERI is useful!

• Some applications play fast and loose with pointer provenance...
  • See, for example, Exploring C Semantics and Pointer Provenance

• The above led to some innovative research into what programmers believe about C
  • See, for example, Into the depths of C: elaborating the de facto standards
Open questions on Morello
Open questions

• To take full advantage of capabilities, software must be rewritten
  • Is it still worth rewriting it in C/C++ or should it be done with Rust (for example) ?
  • Can Rust (or Rust competitor) benefit from capabilities ?

• (How) do proven components compose ?
  • For example, is SeL4 + CHERI + Morello secure ?
  • What does “secure” mean in this context ?
  • How to prove it ?

• Side channels (timing, EM, power) & fault injection
  • Are there single points of failure in the architecture ?
    – That is, failure points independent of micro-architectural implementation
    – Or is it all about the micro-architecture ?
  • Now is the right time to think and fix before it moves into mainstream (e.g. Arm) architecture
More open questions

• How to analyze and automate compartmentalization of large existing code base?
• What’s the relationship between compartments and enclaves? Should we revisit the whole usual nicely layered software stacks?
• ...
Tentative roadmap

Dates are aggressive targets that may slip for any number of reasons

• September/October 2020:
  • Morello specification made public, with a code-translation model of the platform, code-generation tools, tools and basic software stack
  • Tools and software may appear in public repositories earlier
  • First wave of UK academic research projects should have been funded from June 2020 and should be preparing for late 2021...

• September/October 2021:
  • Morello demonstrator boards available
  • Broad spectrum empirical research with Morello begins!
Call to arms!

• CHERI and Morello, if successful, will have a large impact on the whole computer ecosystem
• All are welcome to participate on the CHERI / Morello project.

• Before getting to some industrial deployment, it would be great to have research more widely involved!
• Your expertise and point of view matters
• You have a long term view, and can advise on the next possible steps after deployment
• Now is the right time to avoid doing (again) fundamental mistakes that will have to be patched / mitigated for the next 50 years.
How to participate?

- Arm is interested in collaboration!
  - ... but if CHERI/Morello is successful, we will be maxed out by our business partners and this will severely limit our bandwidth

- Nonetheless, as this affects the whole ecosystem:
  - Stay alert to UK universities getting funding under the DSbD umbrella and seek to collaborate with them. Cambridge and Edinburgh are in from the beginning.
    - Lots of uncertainties in those post-Brexit times on the administrivia for collaboration and funding
    - But UK universities are keen for collaboration with European researchers
  - Talk with Arm’s partners who have publicly pledged interest in Morello:
    - Google
    - Microsoft (via MSR-Cambridge)
  - No harm talking to other partners whom you may have an existing relationship with...
  - If all else failed, talk to us, we can attempt to make the connections
The frog is free and safe ... in an unsecure world

... over to you now!
Thank You
Danke
Merci
谢谢
ありがとう
Gracias
Kiitos
감사합니다
धन्यवाद
شكرًا
תודה