Radically secure computing

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You want to design a critical system (in a nuclear plant, an hospital, an aircraft carrier . . . ): you need to chose your hardware and software.

- What processor?
- What operating system?

**My take:** you are screwed.

We need to design processors (and their ecosystem) that have much stronger security guarantees.
**Content**

1. **Introduction**

2. **The threat**

3. **A new ISA for security**

4. **Wrap-up**
The problems of software vulnerabilities are well known.

The solutions include:

- better language semantics (e.g. the rust language).
- Proof-oriented software (e.g. SeL4).
- Improved instruction set architecture (e.g. the CHERI project).

But Rice's theorem puts a limit to what we can prove after the fact. We can only prove software functionally correct if small or built with a restricted semantics.

For any generic software sufficiently large: there exists a vulnerability.
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Micro-architecture

Abstract machine

Software is built relative to an abstract machine (e.g. the C machine), but this is not the true machine it will be executed on!
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Other limits to proof-oriented software
The compiler cannot know the details of future machine implementations. Proofs exclude common features of modern processors (e.g. DMA).

The gap between the true and the abstract machine creates new vulnerabilities: Spectre, Meltdown, and the dozens variants that followed.
And then, there are the issues with the hardware itself

The attacker can alter the machine during execution: skip instructions, alter cache memories, MMU mapping, ...
Example: moving data in L2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
<th>Value 3</th>
<th>Value 4</th>
<th>Value 5</th>
<th>Value 6</th>
<th>Value 7</th>
<th>Value 8</th>
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Figure: Before fault.

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</table>

Figure: After fault.
The dilemma

High performances, low energy consumption, high security: pick one!
Most processor cores are optimized either for high performances or low energy consumption. Secure elements are coprocessors: they are dedicated to specific functionalities.

We need cores dedicated to security, with new and restricted semantics aka “radically secure computing”.
A new ISA for security

Instructions

addi  a3, a0, 4
addi  a4, x0, 1
bltu  a4, a1, 10
jalr  x0, x1, 0
lw    a6, 0(a3)
addi  a2, a3, 0
addi  a5, a4, 0
lw    a7, -4(a2)

Atoms of our programs
Work on registers and offsets (encoded in the instruction value).

- Arithmetic
- Load/Store
- (Conditional) Branches
- (Unconditional) Jumps
- ...
Confidentiality

Removing side channels

- Tag some registers as confidential.
- If a register is confidential, it cannot be used as the source of a conditional branch instruction.
- If a confidential register is involved, all arithmetic operations have a constant and ISA-documented duration (cf ARMv8.4 DIT).
- For Load and Store instructions, the jury is still out. Forbid confidential registers as address sources?
- Stricter micro-architectural state isolation guarantees, masking, ...

We propose a restricted semantics on which the compiler can base its security guarantees.
Provably hiding the control flow

The possibility to jump arbitrarily in memory is detrimental to security. If, for any reason, the attacker can control the destination, she gains the system’s control.

**Trapdoor predicate**

Let $k$ be a secret key and $h$ a cryptographic hash function.

$$p(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } h(x) = h(k) \\
0 & \text{in the other cases}
\end{cases}$$

**Hiding the control flow**

Let $x$ be the user input and $y$ be the output of the trapdoor predicate.

$$y \leftarrow p(x) \cdot (h(x + 1) \oplus \text{constant})$$

$$\text{jump} \leftarrow 0\times1000 \oplus y$$

Against indirect jumps
Hiding properties

Properties
Without the knowledge of $k$, even knowing the program it is impossible to:
- find $x$ such that we jump to an address different than $0x1000$.
- find the destination address, if we jump to somewhere different than $0x1000$.

Conclusion
The attacker has an advantage thanks to the definition of our instructions.
Forbidding indirect jumps

Why not just forbid forward indirect jumps?

Common answers

- Some programs become impossible to write! (Virtual method tables for OO polymorphism...)
- Programs become inefficient!
Forbidding indirect jumps

Why not just forbid forward indirect jumps?

Common answers

- Some programs become impossible to write → the insecure ones.
- Programs become inefficient → introduce dispatch instruction to recover performance.

We can now extract a precise Control Flow Graph (CFG) from the program binary.
Without indirect jumps, we cannot call a program whose address is unknown at compile time.

Some patterns become impossible

- Creating a process from the operation system.
- Calling a plug-in from an application.
- Dynamic code generation.
Issues without indirect jumps

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An indirect jump implies to switch to a new security domain.
HAPEI: Hardware-Assisted Program Execution Integrity

Program
The program is a list of instructions \( \{i_0, i_1, \cdots, i_n\} \).

Encrypt at setup
\( k \) is a device-specific secret key, \( C \) is a compression function.
- Build the accumulator as the program state: \( acc_0 = HMAC_k(IV) \).
  \[
  acc_n = HMAC_k(acc_{n-1} || i_{n-1}).
  \]
- Encrypt the program:
  \[
  i'_n = C(acc_n) \oplus i_n.
  \]
The several predecessors case

n-predecessors (cycles allowed in CFG)

The state of the program before an n-predecessor instruction must be a random invariant (rebase). We must be able to project all legitimate program states to this rebased value, and reject illegitimate values.
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Solution: use projection into subgroups of $\mathbb{F}_{2^b}$. A subgroup of size $r$ exists $\forall r | 2^b - 1$.

Example: $5 | 2^{16} - 1$, so there is a cyclic subgroup $\{\mu, \mu^2, \mu^3, \mu^4, \mu^5 = 1\}$ for some $\mu \in \mathbb{F}_{2^b}$ with $\mu^r = 1$. 
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Encrypt (5-predecessors): $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_5$. Choose random $c \in \mathbb{F}_{2^b}$. Compute polynomial $P$ of degree 4 such that:

$$P(a_i) = c \cdot \mu^i.$$ 

Store $\{P, i'_n = C(c^r) \oplus i_n\}$. 

Against indirect jumps
Decryption

Decrypt

\[ i_n = C \left( P(\text{acc}_n)^r \right) \oplus i'_n. \]

Works because \( \forall i, \)

\[ P(a_i)^r = (c \cdot \mu^i)^r = c^r \cdot (\mu^r)^i = c^r. \]
1. We need a new class of CPUs, the secure one,
2. around a new ISA with restricted semantics.
3. Indirect jumps imply to switch to a new security domain.
4. It is possible to protect against fault injection attacks with Instruction Set Randomization, but solutions are not practical today.
Thank you!

Any questions?